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Abstract 
The paper outlines the main argument for ontological reductionism in today’s discussion, claims 
that ontological and epistemological reductionism (theory reduction) stand or fall together and 
finally sketches out how today’s most widespread form of reduction, namely functional 
reduction, can be developed into a fully-fledged theory reduction, thus taking up the programme 
of the Vienna circle in today’s philosophy. 
1. Introduction 
The Vienna circle is associated with a strong reductionist programme in the philosophy of 
science, seeking to reduce all scientific theories to theories formulated in a physical 
vocabulary and to reconstruct the statements formulated in that latter vocabulary on the basis 
of protocol sentences and logics and mathematics. In particular, Carnap’s Logischer Aufbau 
der Welt (1928) is evidence of this strong reductionist programme. This reductionist 
programme was considerably weakened when the heritage of the Vienna circle survived in the 
logical empiricism in the United States in the 1950s and the 1960s. Seminal works such as the 
Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) and Nagel (1961, in particular ch. 11) still pursue 
reductionism in the sense of the reduction of the theories of the special sciences to 
fundamental physical theories, but there no longer is the intention to reconstruct the 
vocabulary of physics on the basis of protocol sentences and logics and mathematics. 
With the demise of logical empiricism, reductionism became unfashionable. However, 
during the last two decades or so, reductionism has come back on the agenda, but the focus is 
on ontology rather than on epistemology (theory reduction), since there always have been and 
still are strong arguments in favour of ontological reductionism. The thesis of this paper is 
that one cannot have a coherent ontological reductionism without epistemological 
reductionism, that is, establishing the principled possibility of reducing the theories of the 
special sciences to basic physical theories. In that sense, the spirit of the Vienna circle is still 
with us. 
In the next section, I outline the main contemporary argument for ontological reductionism. 
I then explain why this argument is incomplete unless ontological reductionism is joint with 
theory reduction and sketch out how theory reduction can be defended in view of the 
objections that have been raised against it since the demise of logical empiricism (section 3). 
The material for this paper is based on the book Esfeld and Sachse (2011), which elaborates 
on the case for a comprehensive, but conservative reductionism. In this paper, I take for 
granted that reductionism is conservative instead of eliminativist: its aim is to show how the 
entities to which the special sciences are committed can exist in a physical world and how the 
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theories of the special sciences can be true and can incorporate laws and explanations in such 
a world instead of having merely a heuristic or pragmatic value. 
2. Ontological reductionism 
Suppose that it is possible to define a basic physical domain of the world unambiguously: let 
it consist in all and only those physical properties that occur at space-time points. In order to 
obtain a complete microphysical description of the world, one would thus have to quantify 
over all space-time points and specify which physical properties occur at these points. 
Suppose now that the whole microphysical domain of the world is duplicated (see Figure 1). 
In other words, an operation takes place that duplicates the whole space-time including all and 
only those physical properties that are instantiated at space-time points. The world w* thus 
created hence is microphysically identical with the real world w. Does w* contain all that 
there is in w, that is to say, all the organisms, all the biological, psychological, social, etc. 
properties that there are in w, including the Vienna circle, the conference in Vienna in 
December 2011 and the book in which this paper is published? In other words, is w* a 
duplicate simpliciter of w? 
 
world w world w* 
 
     psychology 
 
     biology  
 
     chemistry 
 
microphysics 
 
 
Figure 1: the world w* on the right is an exact and complete microphysical duplicate of the 
world w on the left. Does w* contain everything that there is in w? 
 
There are good reasons to answer this question in the affirmative. We know that all objects 
that exist in the real world have developed from microphysical objects and are composed 
exclusively of microphysical objects. There can hence be no objects that exist in w, but that 
are absent in w*. However, do complex macroscopic objects possess in w* all the qualitative 
properties that they possess in w? In other words, is the operation that consists in projecting 
the whole domain of microphysical properties from w to w* sufficient to guarantee that all the 
biological, psychological, social, etc. properties that there are in w exist also in w*? Note that 
there is no question of a deterministic dynamics here: we stipulate that all the microphysical 
properties in the whole space-time of w be copied to w*. The issue of what the development 
of the world w in time is like, whether it is deterministic or not, has therefore no bearing on 
this question. 
If a certain biological, psychological, social, etc. property existed in w, but missed in w*, 
we would search for a reason for this difference. That search would take us beyond the 
domains of biological, psychological, social, etc. properties: according to all what we know 
about the world, it is not possible that a duplicate of the world lacks only one phenotypic 
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property – say, the yellow colour of the petals of a certain individual plant, these petals being 
red instead of yellow in w* – without there being also a genetical or an environmental 
difference between the duplicate of the world (w*) and the world (w). However, if there is 
such a difference, there also is some molecular and consequently some microphysical 
difference between w* and w as well. Hence, in this case, w* would not be an exact 
microphysical duplicate of w, but would differ from w in some microphysical detail. 
By the same token, according to all what we know about the world, it is not possible that a 
duplicate of the world lacks only one psychological property – say, the thought of Barack 
Obama on 13 February 2012 that winning the presidential election in November 2012 will not 
be an easy matter. If this psychological property were absent in w*, there would be further 
psychological differences between Barack Obama in w* and Barack Obama in w, since any 
thought is linked up with further thoughts, as well as with emotions and finally with actions. 
Consequently, there would be some neurobiological difference or other between w* and w in 
the brain state of Barack Obama at the indicated time as well as some behavioural difference 
and thus some molecular and finally some microphysical difference. Again, according to all 
what we know about the world, it is not possible that a duplicate of the world lacks only one 
economic property – say, that the Dow Jones Index slightly rises on 13 February 2012. If this 
economic property were absent in w* – in other words, if the Dow Jones Index developed in a 
different manner in w* on that day –, there would be some difference in the intentional 
attitudes and actions of persons between w* and w, and thus some neurobiological and 
behavioural difference and hence finally some molecular including some microphysical 
difference. Consequently, in this case, w* would again not be an exact microphysical 
duplicate of w. 
We can sum up this reasoning in the following manner: there is no biological, 
psychological, social or economic difference without there also being a microphysical 
difference. In other words, everything that there is in the world globally supervenes on the 
microphysical domain. All biological, psychological, social or economic properties that are 
instantiated in the world have some effects (make a difference to the world), and they can 
have their effects only by also having physical effects down to microphysical effects. 
However, in making this statement, we face a serious problem: for any physical change, 
there is a complete physical cause (insofar as there is a cause at all). Any physical change 
comes under physical laws, and these laws contain only physical variables. Even if these laws 
are not deterministic, but only probabilistic, they indicate the complete probabilities for the 
physical change in question. No biological, psychological, social or economic variables can 
influence the probabilities for the occurrence of certain physical changes without these 
probabilities being at the same time completely fixed by physical variables. This causal 
completeness of physics is known since the advent of Newtonian mechanics and employed 
since Leibniz’ Monadology (1714, § 80) to refute dualist interactionism. We can illustrate this 
problem in the following figure (see Kim 1998, ch. 2, and 2005, ch. 2, for an elaborate 
argument): 
 
 causes 
  s1 s2 
    causes 
 supervenes on     supervenes on 
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  p1 p2 
   causes 
 
Figure 2: The domain of the properties with which the special sciences deal – the domain 
of biological, psychological, social, economic properties, etc. – globally supervenes on the 
domain of physical properties. A property token s1 of a special science causes another 
property token s2 of a special science and thereby causes also a physical property token p2 
(the supervenience base for s2). However, p2 also has a complete physical cause p1. 
 
There are exactly two possibilities to solve this problem if one admits global 
supervenience. The first possibility consists in maintaining that the properties (in the sense of 
property tokens) with which the special sciences deal are not identical with physical 
properties (that is, s1 ≠ p1 and s2 ≠ p2). Consequently, the properties of the special sciences 
overdetermine all their effects. For all physical effects of properties of the special sciences 
there is a complete physical cause. Furthermore, the supervenience of the domain of the 
properties of the special sciences on the domain of physical properties implies that there are 
sufficient physical conditions for the occurrence of any property token of a special science in 
the world. In other words, if s2 supervenes on p2, then p2 is a sufficient condition for the 
existence of s2: given p2, s2 cannot fail to exist. 
However, it is not the case that physical properties also overdetermine the effects in the 
domain of the special sciences. The situation is not symmetrical. There are purely physical 
effects for which there are no causes in the domain of the special sciences. But there is 
nothing in the domain of the special sciences for which there are not completely physical 
sufficient conditions. Consequently, it is only the supposed causal efficacy of the properties of 
the special sciences that results in the mentioned overdetermination. The conclusion therefore 
is the following one: a situation (or a possible world) in which the properties of the special 
sciences do not cause anything and thus are epiphenomenal would be indiscernible from the 
situation depicted in figure 2. 
 
  
  s1 s2 
     
 supervenes on     supervenes on 
 
  p1 p2 
   causes 
 
Figure 3: The properties of the special sciences being epiphenomenal. 
 
Overdetermination is hence not a solution of the above mentioned problem that is in the 
position to establish the causal efficacy of the properties with which the special sciences deal. 
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This result is independent of the theory of causation that one favours (for a contrary view see 
Ladyman 2008). For all physical property tokens, there are complete physical causes (insofar 
as there are causes at all). The laws in which types of physical properties figure are strict 
laws. The laws of the special sciences, by contrast, are never strict. Even if one endorses a 
theory of causation according to which causal relations are completely captured by 
counterfactual propositions, there is the mentioned failure of symmetry, since the laws of 
nature figure prominently among the truth conditions of the counterfactual propositions in 
question. That is to say, the counterfactual propositions that are about causal relations among 
physical property tokens have a privileged status, since they are backed up by strict laws. 
There are of course also true counterfactual propositions linking supervenient property tokens 
with subsequent physical property tokens. However, there is no argument visible why these 
propositions should express a causal relationship (see Esfeld 2010 for an elaboration and 
Harbecke 2011 for a counter-argument). 
The other possibility to solve the above mentioned problem consists in maintaining that the 
properties in the sense of the property tokens with which the special sciences deal are 
identical with physical properties. More precisely, each property token in the domain of a 
special science is identical with a configuration of physical property tokens. Supervenience is 
compatible with identity: the relationship of supervenience does not exclude that all the 
properties in the domain of supervening properties are identical with properties in the domain 
of the supervenience base. Instead of the three arrows of causation drawn in figure 2 above, 
there hence is only one causal relation; but there are different descriptions of the property 
tokens standing in the causal relation in question: 
 
 makes true     
     
 
    
          p1 = s1  p2 = s2 
                             causes 
 
 makes true 
 
Figure 4: The property tokens of the special sciences are identical with physical property 
tokens. One and the same property tokens make true descriptions of different types. 
 
However, it is often objected that if one takes the properties with which the special sciences 
deal to be identical with physical properties, then instead of vindicating the causal efficacy of 
the former, one de facto eliminates them, retaining only physical properties in one’s ontology. 
But eliminativism is distinct from the identity theory: identity is a logical relation that is 
symmetric. If all the properties with which the special sciences deal are identical with 
physical properties, then some physical properties are properties of the special sciences. In 
general, if all As are identical with Bs, then both As and Bs exist, and some Bs are identical 
with As. Furthermore, it does not make sense to ask whether a given object in the domain of a 
special science brings about certain effects in virtue of its physical properties or in virtue of 
its special sciences’ properties, since both are the same on the identity theory. In general, if 
  “S” 
  “P” 
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the property of being A is the same as the property of being B, then all the effects that an 
object brings about qua being A are the effects that it brings about qua being B, and vice 
versa. 
The identity claim as such does hence not provoke any eliminativism worry. The point at 
issue behind the eliminativism objection raised against the identity theory is the question how 
the properties with which the special sciences deal can be identical with physical properties. 
That question is well-taken. Even if the identity of biological, psychological, social or 
economic properties with physical properties in the sense of token identity is a fact, it is not a 
brute fact, but we need a theory that explains how it is possible for that identity to obtain. 
Functionalism is such a theory. If the properties with which the special sciences deal are 
functional properties, their essence is a causal role, that is, consists in bringing about certain 
effects given normal conditions. If the physical properties are also causal properties (that is, if 
their essence is or includes the disposition to bring about certain effects), then the causal role 
of certain complex configurations of physical properties can, given normal conditions, be 
identical with the causal role that is the essence of certain properties of the special sciences 
(see Esfeld and Sachse 2011, ch. 2, for an elaborate argument for this view). 
In sum, if one accepts the premises of global supervenience and causal completeness of the 
physical domain, then one can build up a strong argument for ontological reductionism, that 
is, for the view that all the properties that are instantiated in the world are either physical 
property tokens or identical with (complex) configurations of physical property tokens. 
3. Theory reduction 
Ontological reductionism as set out in the previous section can also be accepted by some 
people who see themselves as physicalists, but who reject reductionism, thus endorsing the 
position that is known as non-reductive physicalism. Even Fodor (1974), in his famous 
argument against the unity of science as proposed by Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), can be 
read as accepting token identity, that is, the claim that every token of a special sciences’ 
property is identical with some (complex) physical token. What Fodor (1974) – and non-
reductive physicalists in general – reject, is type identity: there is no identity between types of 
the special sciences – such as biological or psychological types – and physical types. The 
reason is multiple realization: tokens coming under one and the same type of a special science 
can come under widely different physical types. However, this position provokes the 
following objection: insofar as there is only a reduction of tokens, but not of types, the 
problem remains whether the properties on which the special sciences focus cause anything 
qua biological, or psychological properties, etc. 
Let us briefly consider the background of that objection: Donald Davidson (1970) claims in 
his famous paper “Mental events” that mental events are identical with physical events. More 
precisely, all events admit a physical description, and some events admit also a mental 
description. It is not possible to reduce the mental to a physical description. This position is 
known as anomalous monism – monism, because all events are physical, anomalous, because 
there is no nomological connection between the mental and the physical description of events, 
which would enable a reduction of the former to the latter. This position is widely recognized 
to fail due to the following objection: it cannot show that events cause anything insofar as 
they are mental events. Fred Dretske highlights this problem by conceiving the following 
example: the voice of a soprano singer causes a thin glass to shatter. This effe
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virtue of the amplitude and frequency of the sounds. The meaning of the sounds is irrelevant 
to this effect (Dretske 1989, pp. 1-2). The same applies to events insofar as they are mental in 
Davidson’s anomalous monism according to a widely recognized objection (see the papers in 
Heil and Mele 1993). 
The ontological reductionism sketched out in the preceding section differs from Davidson’s 
anomalous monism in that what is identical are not events, but property tokens. Nonetheless, 
Paul Noordhof (1998) objects to David Robb (1997) that in the same way as it is reasonable 
to ask whether a Davidsonian mental event causes anything qua mental, it is reasonable to ask 
whether a mental property token causes anything qua being a token of a mental type. Robb 
(2001) retorts that if identity is applied to those entities in virtue of which an object or event 
causes something, namely property tokens, it makes no sense to raise the qua-question for 
these entities, since they are already the most fine-grained ones. 
Even though that reply is correct, there remains a problem. Let us assume for the sake of 
the argument that all that exists in the world are particulars (objects having property tokens); 
types then are concepts that seize salient similarities among the property tokens that objects 
have, whereby such salient similarities can amount to natural kinds. Multiple realization then 
is the epistemological fact that tokens coming under one single concept of the special sciences 
often come under different physical concepts. The concepts of the special sciences and the 
corresponding physical concepts differ not only in meaning, but they are also not coextensive. 
Consequently, it is not possible to reduce the concepts of the special sciences to physical 
concepts. 
However, in that case, the problem that haunts Davidson and that Noordhof raises against 
Robb reappears: it has to be possible to relate the different descriptions in a systematic, 
reductive manner, if they are descriptions that are made true by one and the same token in the 
world and if each of them is to have a scientific quality (that is, to provide for law-like 
generalizations that are projectible, support counterfactuals, yield causal explanations, etc.). 
Otherwise, it could not be vindicated that these descriptions are about the same entities in the 
fine-grained sense of the same tokens instead of being about different properties that objects 
have. Consequently, the ontological reductionism set out in the preceding section cannot 
stand on its own. Reductionism cannot be had in a piecemeal way. Ontological and 
epistemological reductionism (theory reduction) stand together, or fall together. 
But how can a theory reduction be possible given multiple realization? Nagelian reduction 
(Nagel 1961, ch. 11) has been superseded by functional reduction (see notably Lewis 1994 
and Kim 1998, ch. 4, 2005, ch. 4 & 5). Let T1 be a theory of a special science and T2 be a 
physical theory that covers the domain of objects with which the special science in question 
deals. Functional reduction then proceeds in three steps: 
1) One defines the property types in the domain of T1 in a functional manner by indicating 
in terms of T1 notably the characteristic effects of the tokens that come under these types – to 
put it differently, the causal roles that tokens of these property types exercise. 
2) One looks for realizers of these causal roles in the domain of the properties of T2. The 
realizers of the functionally defined property types may differ in physical composition. 
3) One explains in each case – that is, for each token – why there is a functional property 
falling in the domain of T1 instantiated by describing how a configuration of properties in the 
domain of T2 present in the situation under consideration brings about the effects that are 
characteristic of the functional property type in the domain of T1 in question. 
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Functional reduction hence offers in each case, multiple realization notwithstanding, a 
causal explanation of why there is a property token present falling in the domain of T1 by 
telling us how the effects that are characteristic of the property type in question are brought 
about (cf. what Chalmers 1996, pp. 42-51, calls a reductive explanation). Functional reduction 
thereby explains why there are properties falling in the domain of T1 instantiated in the world 
and thus shows how T1 is about salient properties. Functional reduction supports one-way 
conditionals of the sort that everything that comes under a physical type P1 also comes under 
a special science type S (∀x (P1x →  Sx)); but it does not support biconditionals linking the 
types P1 and S, since some tokens that come under S come under the physical type P2 instead 
of the physical type P1. 
Though one-way conditionals are sufficient for the discovery of realizer types and 
reductive explanations, they are not sufficient for reducing T1 to T2, even if the domain of 
objects of T1 is a proper part of the domain of objects of T2 (T2 may be a fundamental and 
universal physical theory). The reason is that one cannot deduce the laws of T1 from the laws 
of T2: there are no concepts available in T2 that are coextensive with the concepts proper to T1 
and in which the laws of T2 can be formulated, insofar as they are pertinent for that part of the 
domain of objects of T2 that is identical with the domain of objects of T1. Consequently, one 
cannot deduce the laws of T1 from laws of T2: the concepts figuring in fundamental and 
universal laws of nature (such as e.g. the laws of gravity or electromagnetism) are too general 
in order to deduce the laws of T1 from these laws, and the concepts proper to T2 that seize 
particular realizer types of property types of T1 and laws or law-like generalizations 
formulated in terms of these concepts are too specific to capture the property types on which 
T1 focuses: if there is multiple realization, several concepts proper to T2 are needed to cover 
the extension of a single concept proper to T1. 
Nonetheless, there is a possibility to turn the mentioned one-way conditionals into 
biconditionals. Consider configurations of physical property tokens that all come under a 
single special science type S, but that make true different physical descriptions (P1, P2, P3, 
etc.). Each of the physical descriptions P1, P2, P3, etc. expresses a minimal sufficient 
condition to bring about the effects that characterize S under normal conditions. However, 
configurations coming under P1 differ from configurations coming under P2 and from 
configurations coming under P3 in their physical composition. Differences in physical 
composition imply differences in the way in which the effects characterizing S are brought 
about. For each such difference, environmental conditions are conceivable in which that 
difference is relevant even on the level of abstraction at which S is situated.  
Consider classical genetics. Natural selection explains why there is multiple realization in 
the domain of classical genetics (see Papineau 1993, p. 47): depending on the environmental 
conditions, only some of the causal powers of a given molecular configuration, realizing a 
property of the type S of classical genetics, are pertinent for selection. Against this 
background, it is reasonable that the proper concepts of classical genetics abstract from 
molecular differences. There are for instance molecular differences among DNA sequences 
possible that, under certain cellular conditions, do not amount to phenotypic (functional) 
differences. Nonetheless, these molecular differences are different ways to bring about the 
effects that define S. But this implies that there is at least one difference in the production of 
side effects that are systematically linked with the main effects in question – such as different 
causal interactions with the molecular environment within the cell during the causal process 
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from a gene to the production of its characteristic phenotypic effects. For any such difference 
in side effects, there is a molecular environment possible in which that difference leads to a 
detectable functional difference within the scope of classical genetics and the evolutionary 
context because any such difference may become pertinent to selection in certain 
environments (see Rosenberg 1994, p. 32). Consequently, that difference can in principle also 
be considered in terms of the concepts that are proper to classical genetics. Hence, for any 
type S of T1 (that is multiply realized by P1, P2, P3, etc.), it is possible to conceive functional 
sub-types S1, S2, S3, etc., taking those side effects into account. 
These sub-types are no longer multiply realizable, since any molecular difference that is 
relevant to distinguish between different types of realizers leads to specific functional 
differences. The functionally defined sub-types of a special science hence correspond to one 
physical type each. They are nomologically coextensive with physical types and thus make it 
possible to reduce theories of a special science to physical theories in a functional manner. 
 
    S 
    (abstraction) 
 
   S1   S2    S3 
    (coextension) 
   
   P1   P2   P3 
    (integration) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The reduction of a theory of a special science to a physical theory via functional 
sub-types. 
 
More precisely and more generally speaking, (1) within a physical theory T2, one builds the 
concepts P1, P2, P3, etc. capturing the differences in composition among the physical 
configurations that are all described by the same concept S in T1. (2) One makes S more 
precise by building functional sub-concepts (sub-types) S1, S2, S3, etc. of S, seizing the 
systematic side effects linked to the different ways of producing the effects that define S. 
Provided that one such functionally defined sub-concept can be construed for each type of 
realizer of S in such a way that the former grasps the functional differences to which the latter 
give rise under certain circumstances, it follows that these sub-concepts S1, S2, S3, etc. are 
nomologically coextensive with the concepts P1, P2, P3, etc. (3) One can reduce any concept 
S of T1 to T2 via S1, S2, S3, etc. and P1, P2, P3, etc. Starting from T2, one builds P1, P2, P3, etc. 
and then deduces S1, S2, S3, etc. from P1, P2, P3, etc. given the nomological coextension. One 
gains then S by abstracting from the conceptualization of the functional side effects contained 
in S1, S2, S3, etc., retaining only the main functional specification they have in common, 
which is nothing but the functional definition of S. This abstraction step depends on what the 
world is like – that is, what salient normal environmental conditions there are – rather than on 
our heuristic and practical aims. It enables thereby to highlight genuine causal similarities in 
the world that are brought out by the special sciences. As regards the laws, one can formulate 
the laws of T1 in terms of S1, S2, S3, etc. by adding more functional details. Given the 
 Physics 
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nomological coextension, one can deduce these sub-type laws from the laws of T2, couched in 
terms of P1, P2, P3, etc. and then gain the laws of T1 formulated in terms of S by a theory-
immanent abstraction from functional details (that are not relevant in many environmental 
contexts) (see Esfeld and Sachse 2011, chapters 4 and 5, for a detailed account). 
In conclusion, functional reduction, thus conceived, can achieve the same as Nagelian 
reduction, namely a fully-fledged theory reduction. As mentioned above, ontological and 
epistemological reduction stand or fall together. Nonetheless, one can still have both, as 
envisaged in the Vienna circle, although today’s argumentative focus is different. 
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